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On the 24th February 2025, the European Council introduced the 16th set of restrictive measures against Russia through Council Regulation 2025/495 (the “Regulation”), marking another step in the EU’s ongoing efforts to exert economic pressure on Russia and limit its capacity to finance the war in Ukraine. The latest sanctions package imposes stricter measures targeting key sectors of Russia’s economy, such as trade, energy, transport, and infrastructure.

Background

The EU has progressively imposed various restrictive measures against Russia since March 2014, initially in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as the deliberate destabilisation of Ukraine. The EU extended these sanctions following Russia’s recognition of the non-government controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and the subsequent deployment of Russian armed forces into these territories. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on the 24th February 2022, the EU significantly expanded its sanctions regime, targeting individuals, organisations, and sectors crucial to Russia’s economy.

Three years into the war, the 16th package builds upon the EU’s strategy of economic pressure by imposing more stringent restrictions on Russian industries and individuals. These measures are codified under Council Regulation 833/2014, creating legally binding obligations on all individuals, organisations, and bodies within the EU jurisdiction.

Key Measures Targeting the Aviation Industry

The new sanctions package under Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/394 introduces a series of restrictions targeting the aviation sector. These measures prohibit any aircraft operated by Russian air carriers, as well as non-Russian-registered aircraft owned, chartered, or controlled by Russian entities or individuals, from taking off from, landing in, or overflying EU territory. This restriction also applies to non-scheduled flights in which a Russian entity or individual determines the place or time of take off or landing.

The exemption from the prohibition under Article 3d of the Regulation has been amended to include the term “non-commercial” in the description of “private, non-commercial, non-corporate flights.” This update emphasises that private, non-commercial, non-corporate flights are exempt from the ban on aircraft which are owned, operated, chartered, or controlled by a Russian entity or individual, allowing them to land in, take off from, or overfly EU territory, provided the aircraft has a maximum seating capacity of 4 persons and a maximum take off mass of no more than 2,000 kg.

The sanctions now also extend to third-country air carriers that either operate domestic flights within Russia or supply goods and technology intended for use in aviation or the space industry to Russian air carriers. These carriers will be identified in Annex XLVI to the Regulation, which has yet to be populated. Once populated, these carriers will be prohibited from operating flights to any of the 27 European Union Member States. However, this restriction does not apply to third-country air carriers that overfly Russian airspace.

An interesting addition to the sanctions framework is the derogation outlined in Article 3d paragraph 3a, which allows for certain exemptions concerning unmanned aircraft. Specifically, unmanned aircraft used for private, non-commercial, and non-corporate recreational flights within EU airspace may be authorised by the competent authority to take off from, land in, or overfly EU territory notwithstanding that these may be operated by Russian air carriers, or any non-Russian-registered aircraft owned, chartered, or controlled by Russian entities.

Conclusion

The 16th EU sanctions package represents a significant tightening of restrictions on Russia, with a strong focus on closing any existing lacunae and preventing the circumvention of existing measures by engaging foreign aviation operators. By expanding bans in key sectors such as aviation and trade, the EU aims to place pressure on Russia’s economic capabilities and limit its ability to sustain military operations. However, the absence of restrictions on Russian liquified natural gas (“LNG”) indicates a lack of full political consensus within the EU on fully cutting off Russian energy revenues and targeting a critical sector of the Russian economy. Future developments will likely determine whether additional measures, particularly in the energy sector, will be introduced in subsequent sanctions packages.

This document does not purport to give legal, financial or tax advice. Should you require further information or legal assistance, please do not hesitate to contact Dr. Joshua Chircop.